Abstract: The privatization process in Eastern Europe is not irreversible. Future governments may want to partially expropriate successul private rms in order to subsidize unsuccessful ones. We use a simple median voter model to predict the policy of future governments. It is shown that there will be less expropriation the more shares were distributed for free to the population. Diversi ed mass privatization is better than insider privatization. Furthermore, people should bediscouraged to sell their shares for cash. Finally, we show that some free distribution of shares may induce more investment and increase expected pro ts and privatization revenues for the government.
Introduction
What are the most important determinants of success for large scale privatization programs? Drawing on recent comparative analyses of privatization programs in several western and less developed countries in the 1980s, Pablo Spiller 1995 concludes that by far the most important condition for success is the commitment of the government to refrain from discretionary interventions that lead to an ex post expropriation of the returns of the industry. Without such commitment long-term investments and restructuring do not take place. This is consistent with recent experiences in Eastern Europe. For example, the amounts of restructuring and of foreign direct investment owing into some Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, or Ukraine are much smaller than in Hungary, Poland or the Czech Republic see also Footnote 14 which is often attributed to political uncertainties" in the former countries. Another indication for lacking safeguards against expropriation is the very low stock market valuation of privatized companies. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 1995a estimate that the value of total Russian industry at stock market prices is only about 12 billion US$, roughly the size of a medium Fortune 500 company such as Kellogs. Again this is due to the rational expectation of the market that almost all of the returns of these companies will becaptured either by insiders of the rms or by the local and or federal government.
Most western countries can rely on a long tradition of democratic institutions and constitutional safeguards which -b y and large -protect investors against discretionary expropriation by the state. In Eastern Europe, however, the institutional framework is still in its infancy and it cannot beruled out that a communist or nationalist government takes over that does not respect the property rights granted by its predecessor. Hence, a reform government that engages in large scale privatization should not only be concerned with revenue maximization, an e cient allocation of ownership rights, and a fair" distribution of wealth, but also with the long-term political sustainability of privatization.
Many political advisors have argued that governments should give a w a y a large fraction of the shares of former state-owned enterprises to the general population as a safeguard against future policy reversals. 1 This paper is an attempt to analyze the case for give-aways more 1 For example, this argument w as an important motivation for the Czech v oucher privatization scheme. A systematically. We endogenize the policy of future governments in a model of the privatiation process. We assume that a democratically elected new government can to any degree expropriate the pro ts of successful rms in order to cross-subsidize unsuccessful rms which otherwise would have to be liquidated. Expropriation serves two purposes: it redistributes wealth from the rich to the poor, and it insures workers against the risk that their company fails and that they become unemployed. But expropriation and cross-subsidization are ex post ine cient and they reduce the ex ante incentives of core-owners to engage in restructuring. We analyse the preferences of each individual voter towards the degree of expropriation as a function of his private wealth, his risk-aversion, and his ownership stake in privatized rms. We show that several key parameters of a mass privatization scheme can be designed to systematically a ect the preferences of the electorate over expropriation and to make privatization politically more sustainable in the long-run.
Our main results are as follows: First, there will be more expropriation the poorer a country, the more skewed its income distribution, the more risk averse the population, and the more rigid the labor market. Second, the more shares are distributed to the general population, the lower is the degree of ex post expropriation. Third, distributing shares to the general population is more e cient and induces less expropriation than insider privatization, i.e. giving the shares of a rm to the workers of that particular rm. Furthermore, a reform government should discourage people to sell their shares for cash. Finally, giving more shares to the general population reduces the degree of ex post expropriation, but it also reduces the fraction of pro ts going to core investors which m a y adversely a ect their restructuring e orts. It may also reduce revenues of the government. Nevertheless, we show that it is possible that a mass privatization scheme which includes substantial free distribution of shares induces more investment, higher expected pro ts and higher privatization revenues for the government than a policy that relies exclusively on selling shares to the highest bidder.
The assumption that future policies are determined only by the electorate is clearly overly very similar argument w as put forward already during the French revolution. In 1789 all real estate belonging to the catholic church had been expropriated. Montesquiou, a delegate to the French assembl e nationale, suggested to divide the land in small portions and to distribute it as evenly as possible to the general population. It is interesting to note that he did not justify his proposal with equity arguments but referred only to the long-term strategic argument that this policy creates a safeguard against future policy reversals. See G ohring 1951, p. 89. I am grateful to Jean Rosenthal and Lothar Schilling for pointing this out to me.
optimistic. In reality, lobbies and interest groups play an important role in the formation of policies. Furthermore, at least in some eastern European countries organized crime has a strong impact on the economic and political development. We do not deny the importance of these e ects. Our model is rather meant to focus on one aspect, namely the impact of the preferences of the electorate on future policies. We hope that the better understanding of this aspect is useful even if in every given country there are many other important considerations that have to be taken into account.
There is a large theoretical literature on privatization in Eastern Europe by n o w. Most of this literature assumes a benevolent government and addresses the question of how to design an optimal privatization scheme in order to achieve an e cient allocation of ownership rights, to maximize revenues, and to induce privatized rms to restructure e ciently.
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This literature implicitly assumes that the benevolent government can commit to never expropriate in the future. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 1994a take the opposite view of a self-interested government. They argue that nationalized rms are ine cient because they address the objectives of politicians rather than maximize e ciency. Thus privatization schemes should be designed so as to drive a w edge between politicians and managers and to restrict political discretion as much as possible. However, they also ignore the possibility of a future policy reversal. Both strands of the literature take the objectives of the government as exogenously given.
There is a small but growing literature on the political economy of the transition process. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 1994b argue that giving away a large fraction of shares to insiders such as workers, managers, or local governments as well as to the general public is important to get the necessary political support for mass privatization. They are mainly concerned with how to push through privatization in the rst place. Our paper complements their analysis by focussing on the long-term political sustainability of privatization.
Vickers 1993 shows that it is theoretically possible that some give-aways to the general population maximize sales proceeds from privatization if they reduce the risk of expropriation. Roland and Verdier 1994 and Laban and Wolf 1993 argue that the probability of a policy reversal depends on the success of the privatization policy which in turn depends on the level of investment and restructuring e ort of private investors. If private investors expect a policy reversal, they will not invest, the privatization policy will fail and there will indeed be a policy reversal. On the other hand, if all investors expect to enjoy the returns of their investments, they are going to invest and they will not beexpropriated. Roland and Verdier 1994 show in addition that free distribution of shares to the population is an instrument to eliminate the incentives of the government to renationalize, but multiple equilibria may still exist. This result is closely related to our results in Section 6.
There is a very recent paper by Biais and Perotti 1997 that is close in spirit to our work. In their model a right-wing party privatizes and uses underpricing in order to shift the political preferences of the middle class. They show that underpricing can be used to keep the right wing party in power and to make sure that shareholders will not beexpropriated by a future government. However, in contrast to our model they focus only on redistribution and do not consider risk-sharing motives for expropriation. Furthermore, they are only concerned about the price at which shares are sold to the public and do not analyse the other dimensions of a mass privatization scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a simple model of mass privatization and the political economy of ex-post expropriation. In Section 3 we derive the optimal degree of expropriation for a given voter as a function of his private wealth, his risk-aversion, and his ownership stake in privatization. There we assume that some fraction of all rms is distributed for free to the general population. Section 4 compares this privatization scheme to insider mass privatization" where some fraction of the shares of each rm is given to the workers of that rm. Section 5 analyses the case where some shareholders sell their shares for cash before the next election takes place. In Section 6 we consider the e ect of di erent mass privatization schemes on the incentives of core investors to restructure and on the revenues from privatization for the government. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The Basic Model
Consider a reform government that wants to privatize a large group of state-owned enterprises. For simplicity, assume that there is a continuum of identical rms to be privatized, each of which employes L workers. Firms are indexed by k 2 0; 1 and have mass one. After privatization each rm will be controlled by a core investor" also called owner" who owns fraction of the shares of his rm. The core investor could beaforeign or domestic outside investor who bought a controlling stake from the government. However, since it will be very di cult to nd such a n i n v estor for many rms, it may be more realistic to think of the core investor" as the manager of this rm who was given for free or as part of a compensation package. In any case, we assume that the owner exercises e ective control. The remaining shares will be distributed to the general population according to some mass privatization scheme.
At date 0 the reform government comes to power and decides on how to organize privatization. It has two main policy instruments at hand. First, it may choose , i.e., what fraction of shares of each rm to give or sell to a core investor. The remaining fraction, 1 , , is distributed for free to the population. Second, it may decide on how to structure the free distribution of shares. One possibility i s to distribute the shares of all rms more or less evenly across the general population. This could be done, for example, through a voucher scheme which enables each citizen to buy the shares he most prefers on a pseudo stock-market in exchange for his vouchers.
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The crucial feature of this form of privatization is that each citizen ends up with a diversi ed portfolio which does not mainly consist of shares of the rm he is employed with. We will call this option diversi ed mass privatization". An alternative possibility for the government is to give the free fraction of shares of each rm to the workers of that particular rm. option insider mass privatization". The basic model considers the case where share-holding is diversi ed. In Section 4 we compare this diversi ed mass privatization method to insider mass privatization.
At date 1 core investors take o v er and have to restructure the privatized rms. For example, a core investor may have to reorganize the company, develop new products, experiment with new production technologies, switch to new suppliers for inputs, and so on.
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Furthermore, the owner may have to bring in new capital in order to modernize the capital stock of his rm. The probability that these activities are successful in improving the rm's e ciency depends on the e ort and capital costs the core investor is willing to incur. We model this by assuming that with some probability p k , which is a ected by how m uch e ort and money the owner spends, restructuring is successful, in which case rm k, k 2 0; 1 , will make a positive pro t V 0 at date 3. With probability 1 , p k , restructuring fails. In this case the rm would make a negative pro t V 0 if it is kept in operation without subsidies from the state. 6 We assume that the probability of success is stochastically independent across rms and that each owner chooses chooses p k directly at cost Gp k .
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At date 2, after restructuring took place but before nature decides on success and failure of each rm, a policy shift is possible. The reform government is free to design the privatization scheme, but it cannot bind future governments to honor the ownership rights it granted at date 0. At date 2 a new government is elected which may decide to expropriate some rms and to subsidize others. The new government is assumed to re ect the preferences of the electorate at date 2, e.g. the preferences of the median voter. 5 In former socialist countries restructuring of many rms has to be radical. Production may h a v e to switch from military to civilian production or from manufacturing to services. The rm has to take up new activities such as marketing and nancial management, while other activities such as supply assurance or the political education" of workers have to be deemphasized or given up. The capital stock has to be upgraded, workers to be retrained, production processes to be reorganized. A successfully restructured rm may have little resemblance to its socialist predecessor. See Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 1995a, p. 128 and McMillan 1997 for a survey on di erent routes to restructuring.
6 V and V can be interpreted as the expected net present v alue of the rm given that restructuring was successful failed, respectively. 7 The assumption that the probability of success is stochastically independent across rms is a simpli cation that is clearly not met in reality. Roland and Verdier 1994 have shown that there can be substantial externalities between privatized rms and that the probability of success of each rm may crucially depend on how many other rms engage in restructuring which m a y lead to critical mass e ects". However, the analysis of these e ects is beyond the scope of this paper.
The term expropriation" is meant to capture all policies that adversely a ect the private value of the privatized assets. For example, a future government may impose additional regulation which reduces pro ts, it may raise all kind of taxes, or it may return the rm to public ownership at unfair" terms. Outright expropriation without any compensation is only the extreme case. We model this by assuming that the government may choose the degree of expropriation, 1, i.e., a successful rm is forced to pass over V to the government. 8 On the other hand, the government uses the proceeds from the expropriation of successful rms either to nance unemployment bene ts for workers of the rms that failed or to crosssubsidize these rms in order to keep them in operation. From this perspective, expropriation and soft budget constraints are just two sides of the same coin.
Finally, at date 3, the uncertainty about which rms are successful resolves and nal payo s are realized. If a rm succeeds, it keeps all its workers at the exogenously given wage rateŵ. If a rm fails, there are two possibilities. Either all workers become unemployed and have to depend on unemployment bene ts paid for by the government. Alternatively, the government can pay wage subsidies to an unpro table rm in order to keep it in operation. Both alternatives are equivalent in our model and yield the same results. While the analysis of unemployment bene ts is somewhat simpler, the case of cross subsidization of unsuccessful rms seems to be more realistic. Therefore we will focus on the latter interpretation.
For concreteness, let w 0 be the wage at which an unsuccessful rm would just break even. Recall that such a rm would make negative pro ts V 0 if it had to pay the exogenously given wageŵ. At lower wages, however, it may be possible to keep the rm in operation. In addition to w 0 the government can pay a wage subsidy, w. If w 0 + w ŵ workers of unsuccessful rms su er from a wage cut, but they cannot nd better employment elsewhere. 9 8 Note that is not simply a tax rate on net pro ts. In this case the costs Gp k incurred for restructuring would be tax deductible, so a tax rate would apply to V ,Gp k . In contrast, the new government expropriates the rms' quasi-rents, V . Thus, the possibility of expropriation creates a classical hold-up problem Williamson, 1985 with underinvestment in restructuring. See also Section 6.
9 This is clearly a rather special form of subsidization, but it does not seem too unrealistic given the experiences in many eastern European countries. In some of these countries unemployment is still surprisingly low. In Russia, for example, workers are often not laid o by unpro table rms. Instead, their wages are reduced often quite drastically because the rm or the government, if the rm is still in state-ownership is simply unable to pay for them. Workers have no incentive to quit, because they cannot nd employment elsewhere.
Note that we assume that a successful rm cannot cutŵ. It does have enough money to pay for this wage and can be forced by the courts to honour its wage obligations. Nor can a successful rm replace its workers
The time structure of the model is summarized in Figure 1 . The only revenues of the government to nance wage subsidies come from the expropriation of successful rms.
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Expropriation and cross-subsidization are ine cient, however. Not only do they a ect the ex ante incentives of the owner to restructure, as will beanalysed in Section 6 below, they are also ex post ine cient. Some of the money will drain away when passing through the hands of the new government. Successful rms will try to avoid expropriation by hiding their pro ts or investing them immediately in possibly ine cient projects. The form of expropriation through taxation, regulation, forced investments, etc. is likely to distort relative prices, and, last but not least, expropriation may have serious long-term incentive e ects on restructuring e orts and investments. We model this in a very simple way:
Of every dollar expropriated only fraction 1 can beused for wage subsidies, while 1 , is a deadweight loss.
The amount o f w age subsidies the government can pay is determined by its budget constraint. If fraction p of all rms succeed and if the government chooses the expropriation rate , then the budget constraint i s g i v en by:
2 by hiring workers from unsuccessful rms at a lower wage rate. The wageŵ is xed and enforced by trade unions or by the government. 10 In principle, revenues could also be generated through taxation of wages or consumption. However, in socialist times government revenues were raised mainly through the transfer of pro ts to the state budget. In many countries there has been little progress to build up an e cient tax system so far. The qualitative results of the paper are una ected if some xed part of the government's budget can be nanced through regular taxes.
where v = V = L is pro t perworker of a successful rm.
Diversi ed Mass Privatization
In this section we analyze the preferences of the electorate workers and owners towards expropriation given that the government employed a diversi ed mass privatization scheme at date 0. Consider a situation in which all owners engaged in the same restructuring e ort p at date 1 and the expropriation rate chosen at date 2 is given by . Then total income of worker i, i 2 0; L , at date 3 i s g i v en by x i =ẑ i + 1 , 1 , pv + w i ; What is the optimal expropriation rate at date 2 from worker 11 Note that at date 2, when the election takes place, workers di er only with respect to their private wealth. Proposition 2 c below also considers the case where workers di er in their degree of risk aversion.
i's point of view? He wants to maximize his expected utility which is given by E U i = pU 12 Otherwise unsuccessful rms would receive more subsidies than necessary to ful ll their wage obligations which w ould just increase their pro ts. Of these additional pro ts workers as a whole receive fraction 1 , .
However, since 1, they have to give up more in terms of expropriated pro ts from successful rms in order to nance this transfer, which is ine cient.
If workers are risk-averse, some expropriation may still be optimal for insurance purposes. Expropriation can beused to shift income from the good state of the world to the bad state.
In particular, if = 1, i.e., if there is no ex post e ciency loss, full insurance is optimal. The smaller , the more expensive insurance is and the less attracive is expropriation.
The following proposition fully characterizes the optimal expropriation rate of worker i. Proof: See Appendix.
Note that E U i is strictly concave which immediately implies the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Worker i's preferences with respect to are single peaked for all i 2 0; L .
Preferences of owners are also single peaked. All of them prefer to have no expropriation, and their expected pro t is strictly decreasing with . Hence, if the expropriation and subsidization policy of the government is the only issue voters care about, we can apply the median voter theorem to predict the outcome of the election. However, most of the following results are more general. They show that the preferences of all voters shift in the same direction in response to changes in certain parameters of the model.
All of the following results refer to all voters i 2 0; L + 1 . However, since all owners i 2 L; L + 1 always prefer i = 0, these results are only interesting as far as workers i 2 0; L are concerned and will be discussed only with respect to them.
The next proposition gives more general comparative static results on the optimal expropriation rate. 
Proof: See Appendix
The intuition for Proposition 2 is straightforward. First, an increase of w increases the di erence in income between the two states of the world and thus the risk to which each v oter is exposed. Hence, it is not surprising that the higher w the more insurance is desirable and the higher is the optimal expropriation rate. Second, with NIARA, a voter's willingness to pay for insurance for a given lottery is a decreasing function of his income. Thus, the richer he is, the less he is willing to engage in costly redistribution in order to better insure himself. Finally, for any given level of wealth, a voter prefers more insurance and thus more expropriation the more risk averse he is.
Proposition 2 has interesting empirical implications. Part b suggests that the risk of expropriation becomes smaller the richer a country is, at least if we accept the very mild assumption of non-increasing absolute risk aversion. 13 This is con rmed by the observation that the richer countries of Eastern Europe, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic or Poland are considered to be politically more stable and to o er better safeguards against expropriation as compared to poorer countries such as Bulgaria, Rumania, Ukraine, or the former Soviet republics in Asia. 14 However, the distribution of wealth also matters. A c hange in the distribution of income increases the risk of expropriation if this change reduces the income of the median voter. From this perspective the development in Russia, where the income gap between the new rich and the average citizen widens dramatically, gives cause for concern.
Part c of Proposition 2 says, that the more risk averse the population of a country, the more likely expropriation is. The degree of risk aversion could be interpreted as a cultural parameter. It is often claimed that in countries like Hungary, the Czech Republic or Poland there is more of an entrepreneurial spirit" alive as compared to Russia where socialism ruled for an additional generation. If people in the former countries are more willing to accept risk as a basic ingredient of a market economy, they are less inclined to costly insure this risk through ex post expropriation.
Finally, a high w can beinterpreted as a rigid labor market. Workers in successful rms have a considerably higher wage as compared to workers in unsuccessful rms, and the labor market is not very e ective in reducing this gap, for example because of powerful trade unions or low w orker mobility. On the other hand, if w is low, income disparities have been reduced by competition and there is no need to insure through expropriation. 15 But, even in this case, the incentive to expropriate in order to redistribute income from core investors to workers remains.
All of these implications have a strong intuitive appeal and may give some con dence in the model. Our main interest, however, is in the e ect of on the rate of expropriation, since is a policy parameter that can be chosen through the design of the mass privatization scheme. The following proposition shows that the more shares are distributed to the population the lower is the degree of ex post expropriation. Proposition 3 Suppose voter i's utility function satis es NIARA. Then an increase in increases his optimal expropriation rate.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition is again straightforward. If 1 , goes down, expropriation becomes less costly to a worker. Furthermore, the smaller 1 , the lower is a worker's income. With NIARA he thus has a stronger incentive to better insure himself through more expropriation.
Proposition 3 shows that free distribution of shares may bedesirable because it reduces the degree of ex post expropriation and leads to more political stability. Again, there is casual 15 Competitive pressure on wages is of course not modelled explicitly here. The assumption that w is exogenously given and xed is, admittedly, rather crude but necessary to keep the model tractable.
empirical evidence from Eastern Europe con rming this result. The politically most stable of all former socialist countries which puts most emphasis on the protection of property rights clearly is the Czech Republic which also was the rst to employ a v oucher mass privatization scheme which distributed a large fraction of most large enterprises to the general population.
4 Insider Mass Privatization
The previous section assumed that fraction 1 , of all shares was distributed evenly across the population. A possible alternative is to give a fraction of the shares of each rm to the employees of that particular rm. This route has been followed to a large extent in Russia. We will assume that employees get non-voting shares only. There are many additional problems involved if insiders of the rm can exercise control rights, but in this paper we w ant to focus on the political e ects of di erent mass privatization schemes. Therefore we leave these additional problems out of the picture.
Like in the previous section we assume that if the government expropriates fraction of the pro ts of all successful rms, it can distribute pv 16 It is interesting to note that this form of privatization has been chosen not for economic but mainly for political reasons. The Czech government argued from the very beginning that it wanted to distribute shares widely across the population in order to create a broad class of capital owners with a personal stake in the capitalist economy. This was considered to be the best safeguard against future backlashes against the institution of private property Klaus, 1995. which is equivalent to 1 , = U 0 y i U 0 y i 17
The interpretation is very similar to the interpretation of Proposition 1. The following proposition gives a full characterization of the optimal expropriation rate. The proof is a straightforward adaptation of the proof of Proposition 1. The main di erence to the previous section is that with insider privatization workers have to put all their eggs in one basket. If their rm fails, they do not only lose their wage w but also their total income from share ownership. Clearly, from a risk allocation point of view, insider mass privatization is less desirable than diversi ed mass privatization.
It is easy to demonstrate that Proposition 2 carries over to the case of insider privatization. Thus, voter i's preferred expropriation rate is higher the lower his private wealth z i , the higher his Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, and the higher the wage premium w. The interpretation is also very much the same.
But, it is no longer true that i is a monotonically increasing function of , i.e., an equivalent of Proposition 3 does not hold. If increases, there are two e ects on i working in opposite directions: On the one hand, worker i owns less of the company he is employed with, so redistribution is more attractive and he wants to expropriate more. On the other hand, the di erence between his income in the goodand in the bad state of the world goes down, so he has less of an incentive to insure himself, which has a negative e ect on his optimal expropriation rate.
Nevertheless, the following proposition shows that insider privatization always leads to more expropriation than diversi ed distribution of shares, which is the most important result of this section.
Proposition 5 For any and any given set of other parameters, voter i always prefers a higher expropriation rate under insider mass privatization than under diversi ed mass privatization.
The intuition for this result is as follows: For any given level of a voter is exposed to more risk if he holds the shares of the rm he is employed with as compared to the case where he owns a well diversi ed portfolio with shares of many rms. Hence, there is a stronger incentive to insure which implies a higher expropriation rate.
Proposition 5 provides a strong argument against insider mass privatization. Not only does insider privatization lead to an ine cient allocation of risk, it also generates a political climate which is more prone to expropriation as compared to a diversi ed mass privatization program. However, as pointed out by Vishny 1994b, 1995a , insider privatization may be the only possibility for a reform government to push through privatization at all.
Trading Shares between Workers and Core Investors
An important question is whether the reform government should allow people to sell their shares for cash. Trading shares can be bene cial if it yields a more e cient allocation of ownership rights. If some workers are credit constrained, they may w ant to sell their shares in order to smooth consumption. Furthermore, allowing workers to sell their shares may increase the political support for privatization in the rst place. On the other hand, if all workers sold their shares immediately, then = 0 and all workers would prefer full expropriation at date 2. In equilibrium expropriation would be anticipated by the stock market, so share prices would bevery low.
In this section we analyze the e ect on the election outcome if some, but not all, workers want to sell their shares to core-investors. We restrict attention to the case of diversi ed mass-privatization. The case of insider privatization is straigthforward and brie y discussed below. Suppose that, for exogenously given reasons, some fraction , 0 1, of all workers is hit by a liquidity shock and has to sell their shares between dates 1 and 2, i.e., before the election takes place. We discuss below h o w may bea ected by the government.
The outcome of the election at date 2 is determined by the median voter. If no shares are sold = 0, the median voter is the worker with index m = L+1 then the median voter shifts downwards to a worker with less private wealth and a higher prefered expropriation rate.
For concreteness let us assume that each w orker i 2 0; L sells his shares with probability which is independent of his private wealth and the same for all workers. The following proposition summarizes the outcome of the election for this case:
Proposition 6 Suppose that for each worker the probability that he is going to sell his shares before date 2 is given by 2 0; 1.
, then the median voter is a worker who sold his shares and the outcome of the election is the maximum degree of expropriation. If The proof is straigthforward and left to the reader. The proposition suggests that a reform government that wants to prevent future expropriation should encourage people to keep their 17 Note that L 1 implies that the median voter is always a worker.
shares by o ering tax or other incentives to do so. It is interesting to note that there is no problem if only the poor" sell their shares for cash -at least if the poor" do not form the majority of the population. The median voter becomes less wealthy and more inclined to expropriate only if members of the middle class", i.e. workers who are in the top 50 wealth percentile, give up shareholding. Hence, the government m a y w ant to encourage shareholding by o ering tax-incentives that are particularly appealing to the middle-class.
Finally, it is important to note that under insider privatization each w orker has a stronger incentive to sell his shares as compared to the case of diversi ed mass privatization. Since his risks of becoming unemployed and of loosing his income from share-ownership are perfectly correlated, he has an additional incentive to sell in order to better insure himself. If he sells his shares for cash, he is going to vote for full expropriation at date 2. However, if he trades his shares for the shares of other companies in order to diversify his portfolio, we are back to the case of diversi ed mass privatization as discussed above. Therefore, the government should encourage workers to trade shares against shares, but make it more di cult to sell shares for cash.
Free Distribution of Shares and the E ort to Restructure
The previous sections have shown that giving a fraction of the shares of all rms to the general population is an important safeguard against future expropriation. In fact, future expropriation decreases monotonically with 1 , which suggests to give away as much as possible for free to the general popoulation. But, of course, there is a trade-o . First, core investors have to be given a minimal fraction of shares, , otherwise they cannot exercise e ective control. The threshold may be considerably smaller than 50, in particular if non-voting shares are distributed to the population, but some minimum fraction is clearly necessary.
Second, the smaller , the smaller is the return for core investors and the lower is the incentive to engage in restructuring, in particular if a core investor has to incur costs which cannot be paid for upfront b y the returns of his rm. This is the case if the core investor has to spend e ort in order to restructure, or if he brings in fresh capital which is sunk before the expropriation decision is taken.
Finally, revenues for the government may be an additional important concern at the privatization stage. The more shares are given away for free, the less can be sold pro tably to foreign or domestic investors.
Despite these costs we will demonstrate that giving away a substantial fraction of all rms to the general population may not only reduce future expropriation but also increase restructuring e ort and revenues from privatization. We will restrict attention to diversi ed mass privatization in this section. All the qualitative results extent to the case of insider mass privatization, but the outcome will be less e cient.
Suppose for simplicity that there are only two e ort levels, p k 2 fp; pg for all k 2 0; 1 , 0 p p. A high e ort level p means that the core investor actively tries to restructure his rm and to bring in fresh capital at total cost G 0 to himself. In this case he is successful with probability p. If the core investor chooses low e ort he does not engage in substantial restructuring. In this case his costs are normalized to 0, and his rm will succeed with probability p p.
We consider two policy options: The government may either sell a large fraction to domestic or foreign investors and to give away few shares to the general population. Or, the government may distribute a large share to the general population in order to create a safeguard against future expropriation.
In this section we ignore the possibility that some workers may have sold their shares before date 2. Hence, the expropriation rate is determined by the median voter with index m = L+1 2 . Let m p; denote his most preferred expropriation rate. The analysis of Cases 1 and 2 shows that giving away a substantial fraction of shares for free to the general population may be a necessary condition for an equilibrium with signi cant restructuring to obtain. The following proposition demonstrates that this policy may also maximize privatization revenues for the government. Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition for Proposition 9 is as follows. Under the stated condition we know by Proposition 7 that if the government chooses 1 , then there is a unique equilibrium with no restructuring, full expropriation, and zero pro ts for all core investors. Hence, the revenues of the government are also 0. On the other hand, we know b y Proposition 8 that if G is su ciently small and or V is su ciently large, then there exists an 1 , such that all rms restructure, expropriation is low, and rms make positive pro ts. Thus, if the government sells to core investors, revenues are positive, too. Hence, the government maximizes revenues if it gives away for free some fraction 1 , to the general population.
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The analysis in this section has been even more stylized than in the rst part of the paper. Therefore, Propositions 6, 7 and 8 should been seen as possibility results. They show that there are cases where some substantial free distribution of shares to the general population is a necessary ingredient to a successful mass privatization scheme, and that some give-aways may maximize revenues.
Conclusions
The threat of future expropriation is real and probably the main obstacle to more investments and restructuring e orts in Eastern Europe. We have shown that this threat is more severe if the country is poor, if income disparities are large, and if there is a socialist mentality resulting in a high degree of risk-aversion. Our analysis suggests that in these cases some free distribution of shares may bean important safeguard against future expropriation, which in turn induces higher restructuring e orts and higher privatization revenues for the government. We have also shown that insider privatization is dominated by diversi ed mass privatization which distributes shares to the general population.
In order to keep the analysis tractable we used a highly stylized model of the privatization process. In particular, we assumed that the design of the mass privatization scheme does not a ect the allocation of control rights which by assumption are exercised e ectively by the core investor. This assumption clearly is too optimistic. In all Eastern European countries an important consideration is to restrict the political in uence exercised by workers, managers, local politicians and other special interest groups on the rm's decisions. 19 We hope to address these questions in a richer model of the political economy of privatization in future research. 18 A similar result has been shown by Roland and Verdier 1994 . As in their analysis, there may b e m ultiple equilibria here if the condition on G and V is not satis ed. 19 For a discussion of the experiences in Russia see Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 1995a. i.e., there must also be full expropriation with insider privatization.
Q.E.D. 1 then p = 1 8p 2 p; p . Thus, if the government chooses 2 1 , ; 1 there will be full expropriation by Proposition 7, no core investor is going to restructure and pro ts of core investors are 0. Hence, when the government tries to sell the rms to core investors its revenues are also 0.
Suppose the government chooses 2 0; 1 , . If G is su ciently small and or V is su ciently large, we know from Proposition 8 that there is an 2 0; 1, such that a unique equilibrium obtains in which all core investors restructure and make positive pro ts = 1 , m ;ppV , G = g pV , G 68 Note that g is continuous and bounded above with g0 = g1 , = 0 and g 0 for some 2 0; 1 , . Hence, by the theorem of the maximum there exists an 2 0; 1 , maximizing . If the government sells of the shares of all rms to core investors through a competitive auction, its revenues are also maximized at . Q.E.D.
